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SEARCH ACTIVITY IN LDCs
Gary S. Fields
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In recent years, the urban areas in less developed countries have grown
very rapidly.

Between 1950 and 1960, urban areas in Africa grew by 69%, in

Latin America by 67%, and in Asia by 51%, while rural areas grew by only 20% ·
over the same period. 1 Since biological growth rates rarely exceed 3% per
annum, much of the urban growth is due to rural-urban migration.
There is a growing consensus on a number of aspects of the migration queston.
i

3
Both econom i sts 2 and non-economists
·
agree ta
ht rura 1-urban mi gration

can be explained primarily by economic factors:

the "push" from agriculture

and the "pull" of relatively high urban wages. The "bright lights of the city"
and other cultural explanations are given relatively little weight in the
literature.

There is

such migration is quite rational

despite the existence of urban unemployment. The essence of this relationship
is summarized clearly in perhaps the best-known article on the subject, that
of Harris and Todaro:

" •.• migration proceeds in response to urban-rural

differences in exoected earnings (defined below) with the urban employment rate
acting as an equilibrating force on such migration. 114

Finally, it is agreed

that young persons are most likely to migrate 5 and that they experience much
higher rates of urban unemployment than other workers. 6

The reasons for the

-2-

greater propensity of the young to move to economically advantageous areas
have been discussed by a number of writers

7

and will not be repeated here.

In this paper, we shall present a formal theoretical model with which to
analyze the equilibrium allocation of the labor force between labor markets.
Our basic premise is that the same kinds of forces that explain the choices
of workers between the rural and urban sectors can also explain their choices
between one labor market and another within an urban area and are probably
made simultaneously.

The decision-makers -- be they individuals or family

units -- are presumed to consider the various labor market opportunities
available to them and to choose the one which maximizes their expected future
income.
Our point of departure is the received theory of rural-urban migration
in less developed countries, which is the model of Harris and Todaro (1970).
We begin by summarizing the basic features of the model.

While we accept the

basic approach, we show that the particular implication of the model with re
spect to the equilibrium urban unemployment rate substantially overstates the
rates actually observed by Turnham (1970) and others. We then extend the analysis
to take into account a number of important factors which have previously been
neglected--a more generalized approach to the job search process, the possibility
of underemploymen t in the so-called urban "murky sector," preferential treatment
by employers of the better-educated , and consideration of labor turnover--and
demonstrate that the resulting framework gives predictions closer to actual ex
perience.
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1.

The Received Theory of Rural-Urban Migration
The received theory of rural-urban migration, first set forth in Todaro

(1968), has been revised and augmented by Todaro (1969), Harris and Todaro
The Harris-Todaro ver-

(1970), again by Todaro (1971), and by Johnson (1971).
sion is best known and we shall consider it in

that form,

The model treats rural-urban migration primarily

~.s

an economic phenomenon.

In essence, the theory postulates that workers compare the expected incomes in
the urban sector with agricultural wage rates and migrate if the former exceeds
Rural-urban migration is thus the equilibrating force which equates

the latter.

rural and urban expected incomes and as such is a disequilibrium phenomenon..
The three basic characteristics of their model--that migration occurs
largely for economic reasons, that the migration decision depends on expected
raLher than nominal wage differentials, and that migration takes place in dis
Rather

equilibrium--suggest that rural-urban migration be given a new emphasis.

than considering it as a key phenomenon in its own right, migration could better
be regarded as the adjustment mechanism by which workers allocate themselves
between different labor markets, some of which are located in urban areas and
some in rural areas.
Harris and Todaro formulate the problem in the following way.

Let W and
a

W respectively·denote the nominal agricultural and urban wage rates, Eu be
u

the number of urban jobs, and L

be the urban labor force.

u

income (E(W )) is
u

(1)

E(W)
u

=

wu

E
L

u

u

The expected urban
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Expec ted rural incom e (E(W )) is simpl y W.
a
·
·

a

The amoun t of rural- urban migra tion

is a funct ion of the urban -rural expec ted wage diffe renti
al

(L)

u

(2)

L

u

~(E(W ) - E(W )).
u

=

a

The rural- urban equili brium condi tion
(3)

E(W)

E(W)

=

u

a

becom es
(4)

wu

E

u

L

=

wa '

8

u

and the equil ibrium emplo yment rate is

E

= Wa

L

W

u

u

u

How does this predi ction squar e with avail able empir
ical evide nce?

Not

well.

Per capit a inc~m es in urban areas are anywh ere from two
to eight times
as high as in rural areas . 9 Thus, Harri s-Tod aro would
predi ct urban emplo yment

rates of 1/2 to 1/8.

Yet the highe st unemp loyme nt rate obser ved in seven teen
less devel oped count ries is 20%. 10 While it might be
argue d that equil ibrium
has not yet been reach ed, it seems much more likel y in
light of the size of the
gap betwe en actua l and predi cted unemp loyme nt rates that
the theory as state d
needs to be amended to confor m more close ly to the obser
ved facts . This is our
task in the remai ning sectio ns.
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2.

A More Generalized Formulation of the Job Search Process
In the Harris-Todaro model, the probability of obtaining an urban job is

defined as the number of urban jobs divided by the urban labor force.

Impli

citly, this specification assumes that persons living in rural areas have no
In this section, we shall show that the

chance whatever of finding urban job~.

Harris-Todaro specification implies a higher equilibrium unemployment rate than
would be predicted by a more generalized formulation of the job search process.
There are several reasons why rural residents would be expected to have a
positive chance of obtaining urban jobs.

Much urban hiring is done through

channels which do not exclude rural residents. Some jobs are "advertised" and
filled informally by word of mouth. An urban resident may locate a job for a
friend or relative and then send word

(and money) for him to come to the city.

Other jobs are filled by a central labor exchange with which rural residents are
able to register. Finally, those persons in rural areas proximite to cities may
on occasion be able to look actively for an urban job.
However, a number of factors make it probable that locating in the cities
and searching for a job would still have a positive payoff. These include delays
in conveying information to persons in rural areas, the preference of employers
for personal contact with prospective employees, the costs of repeated visits to
cities in search of work, and the simple fact that many jobs are found by
happening to be at the right place at the right time,
All these considerations may be summarized by a single parameter. Should
an urban job become available, each urban resident would have some particular
chance of being selected for it and each rural resident would have some lesser
chance. Let the relative chance of any given rural worker obtaining the job re
lative to any given urban worker be denoted by n. We shall call this number n

-6-

the relative rural-ur ban job search-p aramete r. It is an (inverse ) index of the
payoff to job search;

when job search is profitab le, n is low, and vice versa.

To give an example, suppose n = 1/2 and let the probabi lity that a worker
who resides in the urban sector will obtain an urban job in the current period
be 0.8.

Then, the probabi lity that a compara ble worker who lives in the rural

sector will obtain an urban job is 0.4.

Similarl y, if n were equal to 1/4,

the probabi lity of a rural worker securing an urban job would be 0.2.
The value of the rural-ur ban job-sear ch paramete r n in a given country
may be presumed to depend on a number of economic and cultural variable s in
cluding the length of the work week in agricult ure, the extent of favoriti sm,
nepotism , and discrim ination in the labor market, and the efficien cy of the
labor exchang e.
We would expect that other things equal, the longer the work week, the
smaller the job-sear ch paramet er n.

This is because a longer work week leaves

fewer hours for other activiti es includin g job search.

Thus, the longer the

work week, the poorer the relative chance of rural workers obtainin g urban em
ploymen t and so the lower the rural-ur ban job-sear ch paramet er.
The greater the degree of nepotism , favoriti sm, and discrim ination in an
economy , the greater the expected job-sear ch paramet er. When these factors are
importa nt,

one's contacts , skin color, tribal origin, or other persona l

charact eristics have a greater bearing on his employm ent status than the extent
of his job search.

Members of the favored group could remain on the farm and

just wait to be called;

their prospec ts would be little improved by migratin g

to the city and searchin g full time.

Persons not in the favored group would

-7-

have almost as poor a chnce of obtaining a job from the farm as they would in
the city where they are discriminated against;

their prospects also would be

little improved by full-time job-search in the city.

Consequently, a hig1' j Jb

search parameter would be expected where favoritism and discrimination are
prevalent.
Finally, an efficient labor exchange, in which most urban job openings
are filled by lotteries conducted by the labor exchange, would cause there to
be little payoff to job search and raise the job search coefficient to near
unity. For instance, this was the case in Kenya during the Tripartite Agreement
of 1970, at which time all employers were required to increase employment by
ten percent, workers were required to register with the labor exchange, and the
lottery results were published in the daily press.
Let us now incorporate the generalized job-search formulation into the
Harris-Todaro model and determine the resulting effect on the equilibriun un
employment rate. We shall denote the probability of a given urban resident be
coming employed in an urban job by P.
u

11

all persons equally,
(6)

Assuming that all jobs are available to

p

=

u

E

u

J

u

where E is urban employment and J is the number o'f job-seeker equivalents,
u
u
defined as follows.

J

u

is a weighted sum of the urban and rural labor forces,

the weights reflecting the relative chances of being hired. Since each rural
resident has only an n'th as great a chance of being hired, a weight of one is
assigned to each urban resident and a weight of n to each rural resident.
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Letting L and L be the number of residents in the urban and rural areas
a
u
respectively, we therefore have, by definition,

J u = Lu + nL.
a

(7)

J u is called the number of job-seeker equivalents because the same number of
urban residents as J

u

and no rural residents would leave each with an equivalent

probability of finding urban employment.
The labor market just described may be thought of as functioning like a
lottery in which each urban resident (L) has one ticket, each rural resident
u
(L) has an n'th of a ticket, each ticket is identical, each prize is equally
a

valuable, and. the total number of prizes is E •
u

The expected wage of a member of the urban labor force (E(Wu ) ). is simply
the urban wage W times the probability of employment P11 :
11

( 8)

E(W) =HP
u

u u

E

= Wu

J

u

u

The expected income of a rural resident is slightly more involved, since
If he does obtain an

it depends on whether or not he is hired for an urban

urban job, he will earn the urban wage Wu'·
The respective probabilities are n

E

u

otherwise he earns the rural wage W.
a

and 1 - n

E
J

J

income of a member of the rural laboruforce is

(9)

E(W) = W n
u
a

E
(1 - n ~ ) •
J

u

u
u

Therefore, the expected
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The rural-urban migration equilibrium condition E(W) = E(W)
a
u
becomes

w

(10)

u

E

J

E

= Wn
u

u

+ wa

-u

J

u

(1 - n

E
J

u

u ).

u

The situation described by the Harris-Todaro model is easily seen to be the
case where n

=

0.

In order to determine the equilibrium employment rate, we solve the equilibrium condition (10) for

E

Substituting (7) for J

u

L

u

and (L - L) for L,
a
u

where Lis the total labor u force, we find

(11)

E
L

+

1
u =

u

n

c!::.L

- 1)

u

w

u

W-

n (Wu

a

- 1 )

wa

In the Harris-Todaro case where n = 0,

E

L

u
u

1

=w
u

However, when agricultural

wa

workers have some chance of obtaining urban employment and n

>

O,

E

L

1

u

u

>

wu
Vl

a

Furthermore, by differentiating (11) with respect ton, one can easily see that
the larger is n, the larger is the urban employment rate

E

L

u

Thus we find

u

that there is a lower equilibrium unemployment rate in general than would be
predicted by the Harris-Todaro model and the greater the relative chance of rural
workers finding urban jobs, the greater the discrepancy between the general re
sult and the Harris-Todaro result.
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3.

The Introduction of a Murky Sector
The nature of the migration process and the resulting urban growth are

perhaps best described impressionistically by a typical scenario.

New arrivals

in the cities ordinarily stay with friends or relatives who help house and feed
them while they look for work. A dozen or more people crowded into one room is
not uncommon. They need not live in housing which is rented or provided as part
of job compensation.

Squatter settlements and shanty towns house a substantial

portion of urban populations, particularly in Africa.
Unemployment (by standard definitions) is not very common. Additional house
hold members are expected to contribute to their support. Frequently, they assist
with the household chores by preparing meals, washing clothes, or caring for
children.

Simultaneously, they search for work (albeit on an irregular basis)

and are classified as unemployed.
The most fortunate new migrants obtain a permanent modern sector job as a
clerk, messenger, or whatever.

However, these are the best jobs and the typical

migrant is forced to find some lesser means of earning a cash income. He may
secure one or more typically a succession of wage jobs (e.g., house-servant,
cook in a small lunch kiosk, assistant in a family shop)or engage in self-em
ployment (e.g., selling produce, newspapers, curios, or shoe shines on the
street corner).

These activities have been given several names including petty

capitaiisrn, the traditional sector, the service sector, and the grev area.

A

particularly graphic term, and the one we shall use to denote this whole range
of activities, is the "murky sector."
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Entry into the murky sector is typically open.

For instance, a person

can get started by buying some peas in the matket, removing the pods at the
side of the toad, and selling podded peas to passers-by at a higher price.
Prostitution is another occupation which has notoriously easy entry.
Workers in the murky sector are ordinarily classified as employed

12

al-

though they themselves and the statisticians who measure those things would
be inclined to consider them underemployed. An examination of available time
series evidence suggests that unemployment rates have not in general worsened
substantially over time. Of ten countries which permit analysis, unemployment
rates have risen

13

in three (Korea; Colombia, and Panama), fallen in five (UAR,

Taiwart, Argentina, Chile, and Puerto Rico), and remained unchanged in two
(Philippines and Trinidad-Tobago).

14

The tentative conclusion to be drawn is

that most migrants have encountered limited success and are engaged in some
sort of

murky sector employment.

The existence of opportunities for paid employment in the murky sector
gives each member of the labor force a new option.

Not only can he choose be

tween staying in (or returning to) agriculture or being either employed or un
employed in the cities, but he cart also voluntarily choose to be underemployed
in the urban

murky sector while looking for a better job.

Why don't all workers enter the murky sector?

While underemployment in

the murky sector yields a positive wage and unemployment pays no wage, the
murky sector income is earned at the cost of reduced job search opportunities.
This may be simply because murky sector workers have less time to look for
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modern sector jobs or for some other reason.

In the remainder of this section,

we shall examine these effects and show that introduction of the murky sector
leads to a lower equilibrium unemployment rate than the Harris-Todaro result.
The murky sector may be introduced in a manner similar to the development
of the agricultural sector in the last section. In order to keep the effects
of recognizing the murky sector separate, we return to the original model
(equations (1) - (5)) and assume that agricultural workers have no chance of
obtaining modern sector jobs.
We now have two kinds of urban jobs, modern sector and murky sector, with
wage rates Wu and Wm respectively.

While we will hold Wu constant as before,

we will regard W as an endogenous variable to be determined by the model.
m

Let the relative job search parameter between murky and modern sector jobs
he denoted by h.

The parameter his the probability that any given person in

the murky sector labor force would be hired for a modern sector job relative
to the probability of any given member of the modern sector labor force being
hired.
Since we arern.r assuming that rural residents have no chance of obtaining
urban jobs, the num~er of job-seeker equivalents for modern sector urban jobs
is

(12)

J

u

=

L + hL,
u

m

where L and L are the modern sector and murky sector labor forces respectively.
m
u
Equilibrium between the murky and modern sectors requires that the expected wage in the modern sector (E(W )) equal the expected wage in the murky
u

-13-

sector (E(W )).

)

m

By analogy with the expected agricultura l wage under general

job search conditions,

E(W) = w

(13)

+

u

m

(1 - h

E

J

u
u

) wm•

As before,

(14)

Eu,

E(W) = W
u

u

J

u

Equilibrium between the rural and urban sectors requires that these in turn
equal the expected agricultura l wage (E(W )), which is
a

(15)

E(W) = W,
a

a

since we are once again assuming that agricultura l workers have no opportunity
of obtaining an urban job. Therefore, the rural-urban and intra-urban equilibrium
conditions may be combined as

(16)

E

W = W h

a

u

J

u

u

+

(1 - h

E
J

u

) wm = wu

1.1

E
J

u

u

We now wish to solve for the equilibrium labor force allocation, urban un
employment rate, and murky sector wage rate. From the equality between the
first and third members of (16), in equilibrium ,
(17)

J

=

u

w
u
wa

E

u

Substitutin g this into the equality between the second and third members and
solving for W, we obtain for the equilibrium murky sector wage
m
(18)

wm

=

W (1-h)
a

which is constant for particular values of W ,.,
w , an d h •
a, u

-14-

For the determin ation of the murky sector labor force, we assume that the
demand for murky sector output (Q) is the sum of the demand by employed modern
m
sector workers f(E) plus the demand hy murky sector workers g(L ):
u
- m
(19)
We further assume that since murky sector workers are underem ployed, the demand
is supplied an~ the resultan t income is shared equally among

murky sector

workers , i.e.,
(20)

w

m

Substitu ting (18) and (19) into (20), we obtain an implicit expressi on for the
murky sector labor force as
(21)

[ff Eu) +

g (Lm)J

L

=

W (1-h)
a

1-h

m

w
a
wu

In this general form, we cannot solve explici tly for L.
m

However , if we adopt

the simplify ing assumpti on that the amount of murky sector nnqmr

r1,:,m,:,nrl,:,r l

by

murky sector workers is fixed, this along with the assumed constanc y of Eu
implies that the total murky sector output is fixed at some level Q.
m

tuting Qm

for [f(E) + g(Lm)J in (21) and rearrang ing, we derive the murky

sector labor force as

(22)

Substi

L

m

=

W (1-h)
a
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Substituting (22) and (17) into (12) and rearranging, we find that the total
urban labor force (L

(23)

ur

b ) is

L

-

urb

wa

The urban employment rate is modern sector employment plus murky sector em
ployment divided by the total urban population:

E + L
u
1

(24)

m

urb

Substituting (22) and (23) into (24), we find that the urban employment rate
is
E +
u

(25)

fl

W (1-h)
a

WE

u u

+ n

wa
where

n; =

Q
m

w

(1-h _.!!. ) •

W

This may readily be shown to be greater than Harris-

u

Todaro equilibrium unemployment rate

w
w

(_.!!.) by subtracting (5) from (25) and

observing that the result is unambiguousYy positive. We have therefore demonstrated the validity of the proposition that introduction of the murky sector
leads to a lower equilibrium unemployment rate than predicted by the Harris
Todaro model,
What is the effect of the size of the murky-modern relative job search
parameter on the equilibrium urban employment rate and other labor market
variables?

Our model suggests that the greater the chance of a worker employed
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in the murky sector of obtaining a modern sector job relative to an unemployed
worker who searches full-time, (i.e., the larger is h):

and

a)

the smaller the equilibrium murky sector wage rate,

b)

the larger the equilibrium murky sector labor force,

c)

the smaller the modern sector labor force in equilibrium,

d)

the smaller the total urban labor force in equilibrium,

e)

the larger the equilibrium urban employment rate.

Point a) may be demonstrated by partially differentiating (18) with respect
to h

(26)

awm

ah

=

(1-h wa) 2

w

u

and noting that the result is negative since W
u

>

W.
a

To show b), differentiate

(22)

(27)

w

W Q (1

a )
W

am

u

and observe that the result is positive for W
u

>

W.
a

For c), (12) and (17)

give

(28)

Lu

=

WE

u u

wa

-hL

m

which clearly varies inversely with h.

Part d) is easily seen from the expression

for the equilibrium urban labor force in (23).

-17Finally, differentiation of (16) with respect to h gives a constant J

awm
a'h =

(30)

(W

u

u

and

- W) Eu
m J

u
E

o.

<

1 - h ~
J

u

(20) and (30) imply

0, which along with the constancy of J

a1

u
ah

that

<

0.

u

implies

We now have more urban residents employed in the murky sector

and fewer unemployed seeking modern sector unskilled jobs and therefore an
unambiguously higher urban employment rate for a larger value of h.

!

priori considerations suggest that the murky sector relative job search

parameter h would be fairly large, i.e., worker' job search activity would
not be seriously impeded by taking a murky sector job rather than remaining
unemployed in search of work in the modern sector.
reasons.

This would seem so for two

First, the nature of the murky sector is such that self-employment,

flexible hours, and part-time work are common.

Thus, it is often possible to

adapt one's work week and the specific work hours so as to be relatively free
to search for modem sector jobs.

Second, many modem sector jobs are obtained

by contacts from employed friends or relatives.

Consequently, workers would

have relatively little to gain by searching full time and they would be more
likely to take up employment in the murky sector in order to earn a cash income.
To the extent that these two considerations hold, urban unemployment rates are
likely to be fairly low in absolute terms as well as relative to the prediction
of the Harris-Todaro model.

However, it should not be forp,otten that these low

unemployment rates conceal a considerable volume of underemployment in the
murky sector.

.-18-

As long as the murky. sector labor force has some positiv e chance of
becoming employ ed in the modern sector, the equilib rium murky sector wage
would
15
be less than the agricu ltural wage.
This would be expecte d because the
lower wage is the price workers must pay in equilib rium in order to
have a
better chance of obtaini ng a relativ ely high-pa ying modern sector job.
This gives an additio nal
urban class.

reason for the existen ce of an impove rished

Not only are some people willing to be unemplo yed much of the time

in order to earn high wages when they are employe d in the modern sector,
but
others are willing to be underem ployed by working for very low wages
(less even
than they could earn in agricu lture) in order to have a better chance
of being
hired for those same modern sector jobs.

4.

Prefer ential Treatm ent by Employ ers of the Better Educate d
A number of observ ers of less develop ed countr ies report employ ers using

educat ional attainm ent

as a criteri on for hiring and selecti ng the better educate d
in prefere nce to those with less educati on. 16
What effect does this have on
the equilib rium employm ent rate?
Let us once again return to the origin al model and neglec t the possib
ility
of employm ent in the murky sector.

Now suppose there are two catego ries of

worker s:

the educate d (L) and uneduc ated (L ), of whom L
live in urban areas
e
u
uu
and L
in agricu lture, Suppose further that because of this system atic pre
ua

ference by employ ers the availab le supply of educate d worker s are hired
immediat ely withou t unemplo yment and uneduc ated worker s must divide the
remain ing
jobs.

-19-

The expected income of an uneducate d worker who enters the urban labor
force

(E(W

u

I

u)) is

E(W

(31)

I
u

u) = Wu

E -L e
u
L

uu

and the expected income of an uneducate d worker
(E(W

labor force

u

I

a) is

E(W

(32)

who enters the agricultu ral

I

u

a)=

W.
a

'Equilibri um between the two lahor narke::s for uneducate d workers requires that

E(Wu I

u) = E(W

(33)

u

I

a) or

Eu-L e

wu

1·
uu

= wa •

The equilibriu m employmen t rate for uneducate d workers is
E -1
u

(34)

L

e

=

uu

w
a
w

u

and the equilibriu m employmen t rate for educated workers is one. The total
employmen t rate is a weighted average of these two rates, the weights given by
the percentag e of uneducate d and educated workers respectiv ely.

Therefore , the

total urban employmen t rate in equilibriu m is
(35)

L

L

uu

urb

wa
wu

which is clearly greater than the Harris-To daro result (Wa) except when Le = O.
W
u
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The reason for this greater employment rate is inherent in the job search
mechanism itself, When an educated worker is hired, he fills a position which
some greater number of uneducated workers had been seeking.

For example, if

,&a = 1 Wu, the equilibrium employment rate for uneducated workers is 1 • as given
·
3
3
bv (34).

For each educated worker who is hired preferentially, there is one

less urban job available to uneducated workers and in equilibrium there

W'.):.:ld

be three fewer job seeke-::-s.

5.

Consideration of Labor Turnover
The basic Harris-Todaro model has been extended by Johnson (1971) to

give explicit attention to a time dimension and rate of labor turnover,
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As

before in choosing between the urban and rural sectors workers are assumed to
consider the expected incomes in each.

Now, however, the present value of the

expected lifetime income streams are relevant. For a person in the urban labor
force, this is
T

(36)

V

U

=

0

J

E(W )e - rtdt,
u

where Tis his relevant time horizon, E(W) is the expected urban wage which
u
varies over time, and r is a discount rate.

While T and r have clear interore-

is.
tations, it is not at all obvious what the appropriate value of E(W)
u

Even

at any time tis the "objective"
if we grant that the expected urban wage E(W)
u
mathematically expected wage, i.e.,
(37)

E (W ) = W . 4> ,

u

u

u

where W is the urban wage at time t and~ u the probability of being employed
u
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at that time, the appropriate future values of W and~
u

jective.

u

are nonetheless sub-

In this sense there are as many different expected urban incomes as

there are workers with different notions about future wages and employment
probabilities.

If workers' behavior is standardized and we assume that all

workers behave as if today's wage and probability of finding employment will pre
vail forever, Johnson shows that the expected probability of being employed at
any future time tis
p

(38)

u
p +tjJ
u

where tjJ

u

(1-e-

(P +tjJ )t)
u u

u

is the rate of involuntary labor turnover in urban jobs. Substituting

(37) and (38) into (36) and integrating, for a sufficiently young worker with a
long time horizon (i.e., large value of T), the present value of expected urban
income is

(39)

V

wu

p

u
r+P

= r

u

u

+ij,

u

for urban jobs

Similarly, if agricultural workers

but always have the opportunity of earning the agricultural wage W, the present
a

value of expected lifetime income in agriculture would be
T

(40)

V

f

a

0

w

a

e

-rt

w
dt =

a

r

Rural-urban migration equilibrium requires that the expected present values
in each labor force (V
of the model.

u

and V) be equal.
a

All terms expect P

u

are parameters

Assuming- randomness of hiring, p·u - (the probability.
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of finding an urban job) is the ratio of hires to job-seeke rs.

Johnson shows

that the urban unemploym ent rate varies directly with the rate of labor turn
over, provided the individua l's discount rate exceeds the rate of growth of
urban employmen t.

The Harris-To daro model has no job fixity, i.e., infinite

labor turnover, and therefore predicts a higher unemploym ent rate in equilibriu m
than would be expected for any finite rate of labor turnover.

6.

Conclusio n
In this paper, we have sought to understan d the determina tion of the equili

brium level of unemploym ent in less developed countries .

Following the precedent

establish ed by Harris and Todaro, we have focussed on the voluntary movement
of workers between labor markets as the equilibra ting force instead of the more
conventio nal mechanism of wage adjustmen t.

Within this framework of quantity

rather than price adjustmen t, we have taken into considera tion four additiona l
factors:

a more generaliz ed account of the process of

search for urban jobs,

the possibili ty of underempl oyment in the so-called murky sector, the chance that
educated workers might be favored by employers in job hiring, and recog·niti on
of labor turnover in a multiperi od

framework . We have shown that each of these

extension s implies a lower equilibriu m unemploym ent rate than is predicted by
Harris and Todaro. Since urban unemploym ent rates are observed to be much lower
than the Harris-To daro model predicts, these extension s permit us to retain the
quite plausible notion of quantity adjustmen t as the equilibra ting mechanism
in labor markets and yet also have a theory which is .10t c.:mtradic ted by the
1

facts.
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In interpreting these results, one should not jump to the conclusion that
things are not (or will not become) as bad as the Harris-Todaro model might
have led us to believe.

It is important that we remember that these unemploy

ment rates fail to take into account employment at very low wages or the plight
of the working poor.

Poverty is no

less real when people eke out subsistence

in agriculture or earn less than a living wage while underemployed in the murky
sectors of the cities.

In fact, the social consequences of a low unemployment

rate may be severe, for if planners and policy-makers mistakenly regard unem
ployment rates of 10-20% as indicating that 80-90% of the urban population are
fully and gainfully employed, they may fail to act to increase earnings oppor
tunities.
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FOOTNOTES

1.

See Turnham (1970, p. 107).

2.

See Harris and Todaro (1970), Stiglitz (1969), and Frank (1971).

3.

Especially Gugler ( 196~.

4.

Harris and Todaro (1970, p. 128).

5.

Todaro (1971).

6.

On the basis of evidence from urban areas in 22 countries, Turnham

(1970, p. 47) concludes that "in most cases the rate of unemployment among young
workers is double or more than double that applying to the labor force as a
whole."
7.

See Sjaastad (1962) and Bowles (1970).

8.

In our discussion we shall employ a somewhat different wage determina

tion process from that of Harris and Todaro. The Harris-Todaro model fixes the
urban wage rate in real terms. The rural wage is specified as the marginal pro
duct of labor in agriculture, which depends on the number of agricultural workers
and the terms of trade between agricultural products and manufactures.

Harris

and Todaro specified the agricultural wage in this way in order to be able to
consider the welfare implications of various government policies with regard to
rural-urban migration in a general equilibrium framework. Since our present con
cern is with employment and underemployment an1 other labor market conditions,
we shall subsequentl,y treat the rural-urban terms of trade as contained in the
rural and urban wages and ignore changes in relative price levels. Furthermore,
we will treat the agricultural wage rate as fixed. While this is primarily for
expositional purposes, it is also likely that given the small size of the modern
urban sector compared to the agricultural sector, the wage a potential migrant
could earn in agriculture would vary to a relatively small extent over the rele
vant range and can be treated as constant.
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9.

Evidence for eight less developed countries (East Pakistan, Egypt,

Ivory Coast, Ceylon, Brazil, India, Philippines , and Venezuela) is given in
Turnham (1970, p. 77).
10.

Turnham (1970, p. 57)

11.

In subsequent sections we will distinguish between the total number of

jobs and the jobs for which hiring is taking place and between skilled and un
skilled jobs and educated and uneducated workers.
12.

Except for those engaged in illegal activities which they do not 'report

to census enumerators .
13.

From the first year the series is available until the last.

14.

Turnham (1970, p. 46)

15.

Under more.genera l conditions whereby agricultura l workers also have

some positive chance of obtaining modern sector employment, any value of h
(the murky-moder n relative job search parameter),
greater than n (the rural-urban relative job search parameter) would give the
same result.
16.

For evidence on this point, see Blaug, Layard, and Woodhall (1969),

Krueger (1971), Skorov (1968), and unpublished data from the 1971 Nairobi House
hold Survey.
17.

This extension is described in some detail in my doctoral dissertatio n.

Johnson also extended the model to allow for the possibility that the urban em
ployed might be expected to share part of their incomes with the unemployed,
but this is outside the scope of the present discussion.
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